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FOREWORD 
L' nder Article 4 of its Decision dated fcbru.1 ry 18 197 4, concerning the realisation of 
a high degree of convergence in the economic policies of the Member States of the 
European Economic Community, the Council, acting on a proposal from the 
Commission and after consulting the European Parliament and the Economic and 
Social Commitee, must, at the end of the third quarter 1, adopt an annual report on the 
economic situation in the Community and must set economic policy guidelines to be 
followed by the Member States in the following year. Once the report has been 
adopted by the Council, the governments must bring it to the attention of their 
national Parliaments so that it may be taken into account in budget debates. 
The gmdelines contaJned in this report may have to be adjusted to take account of the 
trend of economic development when the Council carries out its subsequent 
examinations of the economic situation. 
I. THE SCALE OF THE RECESSION IN 1975 
1.1. Since the middle of last year and more particularly in the first half of 197 5, the 
Member States have gone through the severest recession since the war. The 
conjunctural situation has been characterised by falling demand and production, a 
low rate of capacity utilization, an increase in unemployment, and, despite some 
success Jn combating inflation, a continuing rise in consumer prices, still with marked 
discrepancies between one country and another. 
The downswing which ~t.trted in Germany and Italy, spread to the Benelux countries 
and a little later a!"> reached France. Finally, economic activity in the United 
Kingdom, following effort' made to make up ground lost as a result of the strikes in 
197 4, steadily lost momentum. In the middle of 197 5, industnal production had 
reverted in most Member States to its level at the beginning of 1972. for the 
Community on average, it had dropped by some 12Yz% in a year-'. However m 
~cveral member countries the downward phase of the recession seems to have ended 
and the economic climate to have begun to improve. 
I -: In the autumn of 1974, when the previous report on the economic situation in 
the Communi tv ' was being prepared, the much more optimistic forecast made for 
the economic situation m 1975 still appeared plausible, despite the levy imposed on 
the resources of member countries by the quadrupling of the oil price. The main 
The Commisswn has laid before the Council proposed amendments to this timetable 
postponing the deadline until the fourth quarter (see proposal for a Council Decision 
presented by the Commission on 25 July 1975, Official Journal of the European 
Communities, no C 218, 24 September 197 5, p. 2). 
2 See Table 1 annexed. 
See the Annual Report on the Economic Situation in the Community, Official Journal of 
the European Commumties, No C 149, 28 November 1974, p. 1. 
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reason why this forecast proved wrong was that it underestimated the following 
fact( 1rs: 
the extent to which the energy crisis, inflation and counter-inflationary policies 
would aggravate the recession and entail adjustments; 
the impact of these effects - and of their mutual reinforcement -- on world 
trade, and the resulting fall in external demand; 
the extent of the run-down of stocks and the cautiousness of consumers as well as 
investors. 
1.3. For the first time since the war, the volume of world trade will fall in 1975 (by 5-6 
"" .lt an annual rate). The marked contraction in world trade reflects the scale of the 
recession, which, beginning in the United States and Japan, has spread to all the 
industrialized countries and the non-oil producing developing countries. Between 
the second half of last year and the first half of this, the decline in economic activit\· 
led, for the Community, to a reduction of about 20% by volume in the export demand 
generated by the industrialized countries. This reduction was not offset by the con-
tinuing growth of imports by the OPEC countries (estimated at 45% in volume terms 
in 1975). In fact, at present, these countries account for only about 10% of the 
Community's exports to third countries. 
1. 4. In 197 5, the decline in export demand will mean for the various Member States a 
fall in the volume of exports compared with 197 4 ranging from 4% (United Kingdom) 
to 11% (Germany); only Italy will more-or-less succeed in holding its exports to the 
same level in real terms. The forecasts made in the autumn of 1974 suggested that the 
trend would be normal or nearly so, but, in fact, Member States' exports in 1975 
probably have contracted appreciably. The resulting shortfall in demand will amount 
to between 3 and 5% of gross domestic product for 1975. 
Intra-Community trade has declined even more than export demand generated by 
third countries taken as a whole. 
1.5. Imports of member countries have in general declined more sharply than exports. 
At the same time, the terms of trade have improved, particularly as raw material prices 
have declined. 
Except in the case of the United Kingdom, the heavy current account deficit run by 
Community countries in 197 4 will probably be worked down to very modest levels in 
1975. The Community's current account will show a slight surplus 1, despite the fact 
that the German surplus will contract by more than half (by some DM 10 000 
million). Considerable progress has therefore been made in 1975 in restoring external 
equilibrium in the Community. The improvement in the Community's current 
balance has been essentially due to the unexpected severity of the recession and the 
resultant reduction in imports. Financing the deficits has been less burdensome than 
was forecast. 
1. 6. As trade and financial interdependence between the industrialized countries and, in 
particular, the Community countries has become far stronger, economic disruption 
See Table 2 annexed. 
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(inflation and deflationary or reflationary movements) occurring in one country 
''contaminates'' the partner countries more rapidly than in the past and, given the 
multiplier effect, attacks once again the country in which it originated. These 
multiplier effects were particularly powerful when the world recession started in 1973 
and 1974. Studies carried out at international level have shown that a reduction of 
1" 0 in the rate of growth of domestic demand in each of the industrialized countries 
will have double this impact on aggregate demand in the Community countries 1• 
This estimate does not allow for effects being transmitted by mechanisms other than 
trade flows, for instance monetary relations and capital and labour movements. The 
conclusion to be drawn for economic policy purposes is that national measures to 
combat inflation or the economic recession taken in isolation are bound to be limited 
in their effects. 
1. 7. Despite reflationary programmes introduced in almost all the Member States, 
signs of recovery in final domestic demand remained sporadic still the autumn. 
Private-sector investment expenditure is still falling, although in some Member States 
considerable incentives have been provided for investment. The main causes of the 
decline in the propensity to invest are the extremely low capacity utilization rates in 
industry (about 75%), the relentless rise in costs due to losses in productivity, which 
leaves firms in a very weak profit position, and also the uncertainty with regard to the 
economic outlook. Likewise, investment in the housing sector is very sluggish in 
certain member countries and the stock of unsold dwellings ramains high. Public-
sector capital expenditure is the only investment component which, since the middle 
of the year, seems to be on an upward course, boosted by central government 
investment programmes. 
The impact of stock reductions on the trend of activity in 197 5 goes far to account for 
the decline in industrial output. In some countries and some industries not all the 
involuntary stocks of finished products have yet been disposed of. The process may 
well be now complete in some cases as regards raw materials and intermediate goods. 
1.8. Private consumption expenditure has increased only weakly in real terms. In some 
~Iember States it has actually fallen. The growth of disposable incomes has slackened 
as a result of cuts in the number of hours worked and the slowdown in the upward 
movement of wages and salaries. At the same time, the insecurity of the employment 
situation and a desire to reestablish the real value of savings have caused an unusually 
rapid increase in the propensity to save. 
Purchases of consumer durables and clothing have been particularly affected by the 
weakness of demand; expenditure on tourism, on the other hand, has not diminished. 
In recent months, sales of new cars have recovered in Denmark and the Benelux 
countries and aspecially in Germany. 
( )nly central government current expenditure 1s continuing to grow at a 
relatively high rate. 
1.9. The deterioration in the labo11r market situation has taken on alarming 
proportions. In all the member countries 197 5 will see a sharp fall in employees. In the 
The multiplier is believed to be higher than 2 for the Benelux countries, Denmark and 
Ireland and lower than 2 for France and Ttaly. 
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Community as a whole, the unemplo\'ed totalled almost 5 million in August 1975, 
which, after seasonal adjustment, represents more than 4~0'0 of the working 
population, and is about 2 million up on the August 197 4 total 1• Short-time working 
is spreading in most of the Member States, in particular France and Italy, less overtime 
is being worked, ·and the number of unfilled vacancies has dropped. Since the end of 
the holiday period, there have been, in some member countries, some weak signs that 
unemployment might be levelling off, but with the arrival on the labour market of 
school-leavers, a further deterioration in the situation is to be feared. In an attempt to 
maintain the level of employment in construction, many Member States have adopted 
measures which could prevent a fresh downturn in this sector. 
1.1 0. As a result of the anti-inflationary policies, the fall in world prices and the 
weakness of demand, inflation has eased in all the Member States. The slowdown in the 
upward price movement has occurred at different times and with differing intensity 
from country to country 2 • Some definite progress has been made, in particular in 
Denmark, the Federal Rupublic of Germany, in Italy and, quite recently, in Ireland. 
On average for the year, however, the rise in consumer prices for the Community as a 
whole, estimated at about 12~% between 197 4 and 197 5, will not change much; and 
the range of inflation rates -between Germany (about 6% in 197 5) and Ireland and 
the United Kingdom (about 22-23lj0 ) - will be wider in 1975 than in 1974. 
Consumer prices for manufactured products have risen less than those for other 
products and services, although wage costs per unit of output in industry are still 
rising. This reflects keener competition, but also means that firms will face falling 
profit rates in industry. The underlying upward trend of foodstuff prices and the 
many increases in public service charges and prices for services and energy have 
limited the modetation of the rate of increase in the general price level. 
II. ECONOMIC POLICY IN 1975 
2.1. In view of the persistence of inflation and the slowdown in economic activity, 
the governments of the member countries face difficult decisions. Only the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the Netherlands have been able to follow clearly 
expansionary policies since the beginning of 1975. Given the seriousness of domestic 
disequilibria and external deficits, most other member countries have only very 
gradually been adjusting their demand management policies towards reflation. 
Consequently, and also as a result of structural rigidities and the long time-lags before 
the measures, once taken, have begun to bite, economic policy has not shown, on the 
whole, the expected results. 
2.2. Since the autumn of 197 4, the authorities, at first in a number of countries and 
then in all the countries, have been gradually moving away from a restrictive monetary 
poliry. The first measures taken to relax monetary policy were designed merely to 
offset an incipient slowdown in activity. It is only in the course of 1975 that monetary 
policy has become steadily more expansionary. The strength of the measures taken 
1 See Table 3 annexed. 
2 See Tables 2 and 4 annexed. 
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and their timing have varied between countries: those which, in view of their rate of 
intlation and their balance of payments situation, enjoyed the greatest scope for 
manoeuvre, took the most energetic action. Germany was the first country to set its 
policy on a fresh course. After slackening somewhat, the rate of growth of the money 
supply in most Member States has tended to gather momentum since the .spring. Since 
the end of last year, with the demand for credit falling, quantitative restrictions on the 
volume of bank lending have either been relaxed or abolished altogether. Most 
interest rates are, generally speaking, a good deal lower than in the autumn of 1974, 
owing to the high propensity to save and the weakness of demand for funds from 
firms and individuals. Since the spring of this year, short-term rates have steadily 
drifted downwards in the Community whilst picking up again in the United States. 
This scissors movement and the improvement in the American oonjunctural situation 
and balance of payments has strengthened the dollar. The currencies in the "snake" 
had depreciated against the dollar by an average of 11% at the end of September, 
compared with their best level in the first half of 1975. The corresponding figures for 
the lira and sterling are 7° 0 and 14"" respectively. 
In general, long-term interest rates have been slow to imitate the fall in short-term 
rates; indeed, in a number of Member States, there has been an actual tendency for 
them to rise since the summer. Although the propensity to save has been exceptionally 
buoyant, there has been no great inclination to invest in bonds. In addition, the 
impovement in share prices which all member countries experienced before the spring 
has now become rather less assured, with those of some shares even falling sharply 
during the summer. 
2.3. While, in most Member States, the budgets adopted for 197 5 were part of a 
cautious, even restrictive, policy dictated by the severe disequilibria in the economic 
situation in the autumn of 197 4, the actual administration of the budgets has, during 
1975, been redirected so as to support economic activity. Given the conflicting 
objectives facing them, the Member States have, to differing degrees, had to attach 
increasingly greater priority to safeguarding the level of employment. This change of 
direction in public finance has been determined partly by built-in reactions to the 
deterioration in the economic situation affecting both spending (on unemployment 
benefits, in particular) and tax revenue. Most governments have, however, made 
several adjustments to their budgets during 1975 in an attempt to sustain the level of 
effective demand. Thus budget deficits have swollen considerably 1. 
2.4. The United Kingdom and Denmark have to a large extent resorted to incomes 
policies. In almost all the other Member States, price restraint and competition policies 
have been adopted. Belgium, for instance, has imposed a selective price freeze, while 
France has blocked certain prices and imposed controls on profit margins. 
Ill. OUTLOOK FOR THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN 1976 
3.1. On what is at present the most likely assumption- that the stimulus afforded by 
the expansion in world trade, the reflationary measures taken by the public 
See Table 5 annexed. 
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authorities, the spontaneous internal factors of recovery and renewed confidence will 
exert a combined impact -the economy could well start to pull out of the recession 
between now and early 1976. In this case, it would be reasonable to expect the gross 
domestic product in the Community as a whole to expand by 3 to 3Y2% in real terms 
in 1976, given that it will have fallen by 2Y2% in 1975. 
3.2. The validation of this assumption about economic developments In the 
Community in 197 6 will depend on: 
the extent to which the policies designed to stimulate the economy will in fact 
make an effective contribution to spontaneaous expansionary factors and to a 
recovery in external demand; 
the speed of recovery in industry's and consumers' confidence in future economic 
developments. 
3.3. The strength of the recovery in demand will depend on the buoyancy of the world 
eco11omy in the months ahead. Growth of around 5% in the volume of world trade 
(volume of imports, excluding Community imports) seems reasonable in 1976, in 
spite of the deflationary impact of the recent 10% rise in the price of oil. An increase of 
about 6% in the imports of the industrialized non-member countries (197 5: -1 0°~) is 
all the more probable since Japan andthe United States have passed the low points of 
their recessions and have since then steadily gained ground. But there too, there is the 
danger that a fresh upsurge in inflation will cause economic agents to quickly revise 
their expectations. The demand for imports in the OPEC countries will continue to 
grow, albeit at a less rapid rate (about 20-25% in 1976) while the import demand in 
state-trading countries will tend, at the very least, to settle at a stable level. 
3.4. The programmes to stimulate economic activiry recently adopted in Italy, Germany, 
France, Denmark and the Netherlands should produce results in coming months, 
both in the capital goods industries and in the construction sector. The results will be 
all the better insofar as the official programmes are reflected in orders promptly placed 
and insofar as the cautious approach to spending adopted by the local authorities in 
certain Member States can be countered more energetically. 
The reconstitution of stocks will also boost production, and this process seems already 
to have got under way in some Member States; it could account for an increase of 1° 0 
or more in the gross national product and at the same time stimulate imports of raw 
materials. 
3. 5. There can be no lasting recovery in the economy until households' normal 
propensity to consume has been restored. However, as long as the uncertainties 
affecting incomes and employment policies persist, private constllllption dema11d will 
remain depressed, while the propensity to save will remain strong. In order to bolster 
confidence, it is just as important to start curbing inflation as it is to bring about close 
cooperation between unions and management in respect of incomes policy, 
employment policy and social policy. 
3.6. With so many firms running below or well below capacity, there is little chance 
that private investment will substantially boost demand in the months ahead. 
' 
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The reluctance of managements to implement investment programmes will probably 
be overcome only when there is definite evidence of a recovery in final demand and 
when the cash situation of firms shows an improvement, i.e. at a later stage in the 
recovery of the economy. 
3. 7. Recovery of output will occur at different times and with different growth rates 
in different countries 1• The relative weakness of these rates is not surprising, and is 
due, among other factors to: 
pessimism among the different economic groups caused by the shock of the 
energy crisis and the persistence of the recession; 
distortions and rigidities in the economic system caused by prolonged inflation; 
the weakening of important sectors which in the past have been motors of 
expansion; 
the profound changes which have occured in the international scene. 
3.8. In the first instance, the recovery of expansion will entail an increase in the 
number of hours worked per person employed, with less part-time working. The 
numbers of whol(y unemplo.)'ed will probably begin to decline only from mid-1976 
onwards. For the average of 1976, the number of persons unemployed in the 
Community could well increase by half a million compared with the average for 1975, 
to reach nearly 5 million. 
3.9. Although the recovery is likely to be slow, the dangers of inflation will be ever-
present. Wages and salaries could well respond too quickly to the recovery of the 
economy. Managements, for their part, will be tempted to restore profit margins 
more rapidly than in the past. Lastly, the upward movement in import prices, of raw 
materials for instance, and more particularly the recent increase in oil prices, are 
bound to affect internal prices. It is therefore to be feared that the tempo of the 
upward movement in consumer prices in the member countries of the Community 
will be scarcely slower than at present. A rate of inflation below 10% in the 
Community as a whole could, therefore, only be acheived through major efforts on 
the part of member countries. 
3.1 0. The Community's current account, as that of certain of its members in particular, 
should begin to worsen in 1976. A deterioration in the terms of trade is also to be 
expected. 
3.11. 1976 will be characterised by the persistence of price inflation in the 
Community and uncertainties about international economic relations. 
A reappearance of inflationary pressures will quickly threaten the confidence of the 
various economic groups, will necessitate premature restrictive policies and lead to a 
new employment crisis. Moreover, the weakness of the point of departure, in 
particular as far as the financial position of enterprises and the public sector is 
concerned, threatens to throttle the recovery. 
To sum up, the economic situation in the Community remains precarious. 
See Table 2 annexed. 
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IV. GUIDELINES FOR ECONOMIC POLICY 
a) General guidelines 
4.1. Despite the efforts of governments and both sides of industry, the senous 
difficulties and the dangers confronting the economies of the Community countries 
have by no means been overcome. However a deep depression has been avoided. 
The increasing degree of economic interdependence and the unexpected scale of the 
world recession are pressing reasons for pursuing efforts to strengthen economic 
coordination at Community and international level. 
This coordination does not mean that the Member States should pursue identical 
economic policies, since both from a conjunctural and a structural point of view, they 
still differ too widely for this. However, an alignment of fundamental objectives 
seems essential if what has been achieved so far as a Community is to be preserved and 
further progress is to be made along the road to European integration. 
4.2. In most Member States, budgetar:y poliq will still need to support economic 
activity over the coming months. In several countries, there is a case for heavier 
overall spending by the public authorities in 1976 (volume). Similarly a reduction in 
direct taxation must be envisaged in many cases, if only to account for some or all of 
the effects of' 'fiscal drag''. The uncertainly about the conjunctural situation requires 
great flexibility in public finance policy: while the budget is an eminently suitable 
instrument for checking the decline in economic activity, any over-stimulation of 
domestic demand or excessive monetary financing might well produce a new bout of 
inflation which would cut short a nascent recovery. 
If activity does pick up substantially, the authorities should then stabilize or scale 
down their budget deficit during the year, not as a restrictin· policy but because no 
further large-scale reflationary measures would be needed and because tax revenues 
would start rising again as activity picked up. Stabilizing or reducing the deficit 
would be in line with the need for a non-inflationary recovery enabling a larger share 
of total savings to be alloc.1ted to meeting the growing need for credit in the private 
sector. It should herald a tightening up of public finances which will in any event be 
needed in the years to come. 
4. 3. In 197 5, the Member States in general followed expansionary monetaf]' policze.r. In 
most member countries these policies should be maintained to provide backing for 
the movement towards economic recovery. They should, however, be conducted 
with prudence so that any excessive expansion of liquidity can be avoided when the 
recovery of private-sector borrowing, taken with public treasury financing 
requirements, swells the demand for credit. 
Also monetary polin must avoid excessive interest rate differentials vis-a-vis the 
international market so as to prevent disturbing capital movements. These 
considerations lead inevitably to the conclusion that close coordination is necessary 
both between the Member States and between the Communit\" and the principal n< m-
member countrie~. 
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4.4. The most urgent task now facing the authorities and various socio-economic 
gmups is to ensure that economiC recovery in the Community can get under way and 
th.tt the conditions are established under which lasting growth and an improvement 
in the employment situation can be achieved. Industrial strife or renewed inflationary 
patterns of behaviour would undermine the fragile foundations of economic 
progress, would make the recoven that much more difficult to achieve, and threaten 
the employment situation. 
Cooperatto/1 between the two sides of industry and the .tuthorities ts the key to :tny 
revt' .tl of' "nfidence in future economic growth. But it cannot he built up unles' the 
distribution ()f the burden created by the economic ditticulties I' .ts fair as possible. 
\X Ith regard to firm-,, It m<w reasonably be expected that they should improve their 
financial situation as :1 result of progress in productivJt\· and fuller use of capacity and 
that they should show the greatest restraint 111 their prices policy. Supervision of 
pnces .tnd a policy of keen competitiOn should help to limit price increases . 
If profits and the propensit1· to invest are to Improve, the unions must show 
modt:ration in wage demands and, for a lJmJted period, the1 must forego the large 
increases in real income obtained over recent years, since these have largely 
outstripped increases in productivity and have led to a heav1· increase in the share of 
n.ttional income accounted for by wages. Such a \\ .tge' policy is, howe1·er, 
conceivable only if there is fuller worker participation In drawing up economic policy 
and greater information on economic developments. 
Finally the authorities must face the difficult task of containing budget deficits and, at 
the same time, of facilitating not '>n h the economic recoven· but also the changes 
needed in the long term, through practt,ing a courageous socwl policy and .tn 
effective employment policy. 
b) The guidelines for Member Countries 
In Den!J/ark, the effect on domestic demand of the reflationary measures taken in 
September and the expected upturn in external demand should encourage a recm n~· 
111 activity in the coming months. This recovery, however, will only give rise to a slow 
increase in employment and the number of unemployed could remain high. The rate 
of price increases will probably continue to fall. The expected development of 1m ports 
is likely to lead to a sharp deterioration in the current account of the balance of 
payments. 
The extension of the pav agreements of last ~pring has contnbuted to a more moderate 
development in price' .md salaries; the strict application < >f these agreements should 
mean further progress in this direction. The improved costs situation could help to 
stimulate exports in an intensely competitive situation and to limit the size of the 
external deficit. 
In this respect, budgetar~ policy, which has helped to achieve a more favourable 
development of incomes, should try to ensure 111 p:lrticular that the deliberate 
lessening of the fiscal burden undertaken since the beginning of 197 5 should be offset 
by <l slower rate of increase of current expenditure which, given a favour.1ble 
development of the economy, should enable the budget deficit to be reduced. 
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Monetary policy should seek to counter the consequences which could rise in a period 
of economic recovery, from an excessive growth of domestic liquidity caused by a 
large Government deficit. The monetary authorities should, in addition, try to ensure 
a substantial inflow of capital. Credit policy should aim at preventing the appearance 
of destablising factors, especially in the construction sector. 
The economic upturn which had been expected, in the Federal Republic of Gem;any, has 
not ~ et occurred and available production capacity continued to increase up to the 
summer. 
The measures undertaken by the authorities responsible for economic policy to 
increase the level of economic activity, the awaited recovery of the world economy, as 
well as the eventual strengthening of private consumption and the propensity to 
invest should give rise, in a short time, to a turn-round in economic activity and a 
progressive rise in economic growth. Nonetheless, a considerable measure of 
uncertainty still affects the hopes placed on the factors leading to an upturn. In the 
first stages an expansion of world trade will not be of great help to the Federal 
Republic of Germany, on the one hand because of the structure of its exports which 
are directed largely towards plant and machinery, on the other hand as a result of 
delayed reactions to. exchange rate changes which could possibly still influence the 
German economy. Under these conditions the task of economic policy will be 
essentially to support, to the extent required, the forces of expansion in order to attain 
in 1976 a higher rate of capacity utilisation. 
Budgetary policy should be flexible. On the one hand it should continue in line with 
the decisions arrived at for improving the structure of the budget and to continue to 
limit the budget defiot in the medium-term, and on the other hand, with a view to the 
upturn in economic activity, it should show a deficit in 1976 similar to that of 1975. A 
possible short-fall in tax receipts should not lead to new reductions in expenditures in 
the short term; where necessary, supplementary measures for supporting the level of 
activity should be taken. 
Monetary policy should be such as to allow an ec• m< >mlC recuyery while preventing 
the development of inflationary tensions .. \ n abund.tncc of liguidity in the economy, 
and if necessary the adoption of open market polictL''· ~hould make the financing of 
the deficits easier and inhibit an unwarranted nse tn long-term interest rates. 
The increase in prices might, however, continue to slow down, above all if moderate 
wags rises are agreed on at the next nq~otiations which will limit costs on enterprises 
and if the latter by the help of a better utilisation of capacity could bring about new 
increases in productivity. 
In Fra11ce, the recession which the economy h.1s undergone in 1975 following a sharp 
fall in demand, seems to a large extent to have been brought about by a severe run-
down in stocks. This resulted from the fact that the business sector suffered severe 
liquidity problems, as price and employment policies prevented it from passing on the 
extra burden resulting from the deterioration of the terms of trade in 1973 and 197 4. 
The reconstitution of stocks, a process which is beginning, will bring about a marked 
' 
) 
recovery, but sustained expansion requires that the other components of demand, 
notably private fixed investment, react favorably to this year's stimulatory measures 
and improved prospects for the future. However unemployment will certainly remain 
high throughout most of 1976. The trade balance which will show a substantial 
surplus in 1975 will probably be close to equilibrium next year. 
The depth of the recession has made it easier to curtail inflation. As the economy starts 
to expand and since raw material prices are now increasing, it will prove extremely 
difficult to effect a further cut in the monthly rate of price increases. Certainly the high 
wage rate increases of the first half of this year, as well as the rises in employers' social 
security contributions have yet to be fully reflected in wholesale prices. 
If the economic expansion is sustained through the course of 1976 the budget deficit, 
which in terms of execution will be close on 40 000 million francs in 1975, should be 
limited. But given that certain expenditures decided upon in the 197 5 expansionary 
programmes will not be effected till next year a certain deficit will occur in 1976. 
Besides, in order to ensure that recovery is sustained it may be necessary to take 
further measures with budgetary implications. 
Monetary policy has not been restrictive during the recession. Ceilings on bank 
lending have not been reached. The money supply in 1975 has risen at a higher rate 
than GDP in value terms. Interest rates have tended to fall substantially. In 1976 
developments in the monetary aggregates should be watched closely to avoid any 
appearance of inflationary pressures later in the year. 
In Ireland recovery could occur within the next few months, but that recovery will be 
slow until the world economic situation, and particularly that of the United 
Kingdom, gives it greater impetus. The employment position will remain worrying 
and unemployment will stay at a high level. The inflation rate will continue to slow 
down. The current balance of payments will improve before the recovery becomes 
fully established. 
Policy on incomes will play the most important role in consolidating the present 
tendency towards a slowdown in the rate of inflation, by reducing cost increases, 
which threaten the competitive position of Irish goods. To achieve this it is not 
sufficient to institute an automatic link between prices and wages. Limitations on 
incomes growth and spreading that growth over time should be implemented for all 
social groups. 
Budgetary policy in 197 6 needs to restrain the growth of public consumption and 
avoid excessive increases in private consumption. This implies that the net borrowing 
requirement be brought down to considerably below the 17% of the gross domestic 
product which it will certainly reach in 1975. 
Monetary policy should be prudent, particularly during the recovery period, so as to 
avoid allowing the growth in internal liquidity, which results from the increase in the 
finance needed by the public sector in the last two years, to raise new inflationary 
pressures. During this period, the authorities should also aim at the building up of the 
necessary resources for financing productive investment in the private sector. 
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In lta{J•, the considerable progress achieved since the end of 1974 towards restoring 
external and internal equilibrium has been accompanied by a very marked economic 
recession. The authorities have found themselves required to stimulate actiYity 
through an easy money policy and even more so through budgetary measures. But 
economic expansion will only become more rapid when world trade recovers and 
when the settlement of the agreements with the trade unions in the autumn has 
eliminated the uncertainty about them, particularly insofar as the profitability of 
companies is concerned. 
In this context the government should do all it can to speed up the implementation of 
the expansionary measures, especially given the fact that delays could endanger a 
balanced growth in the near future. Budgetary policy should aim at eliminating 
rigidities in public expenditure and in augmenting tax receipts as far as necessary to 
meet the requirements of the infrastructure and public serYices. In this respect 
tightening controls to reduce tax eYasion should become a prime goal. Besides, a 
greater flexibility in anticvclical measures should be sought, particularly through 
simplifying administrative procedures, by speeding up the implementation of state-
fianced investment programmes, and if necessary by modifying the current 
legislation. Moreover, there is some danger that the continuance in the medium term 
of a high current account deficit might lead to serious problems in financing 
investment and then to an unfavourable impact on internal and external equilibrium, 
and so lead to a stop-go cycle which can only have serious implications. 
Monetary policy, in reducing interest rates, will rightly help to increase the demand 
for credit by the private sector. Howeyer such -a policy needs to be implemented 
carefully in order not to upset the attractiveness of the Italian capital market for 
foreign investors and to reduce the balance of payments constraint. Moreover, the 
balance of payments could be threatened by speculative purchases occasioned by the 
economic recovery and the rising prices of raw materials. In the near future the 
monetary authorities must show prudence, particularly in appreciating the real needs 
of the economy in so far as credit is concerned. 
In the Netherlands considerable support has been and is still being given to domestic 
demand. In the framework of the budget for 1976 the government has further 
reinforced its reflationary policy. According to the draft budget, the net borrowing 
requirement of the State should reach Fl14,500 million, including the amortisation of 
the national debt. 
Despite the strongly expansionary stance of budgetary policy, the employment 
situation is unlikely to Improve noticeably next year. Indeed, even if the expected 
recovery in foreign demand were to become evident very soon, it could not have 
much influence on unemployment until after a relatively long time-lag. The 
reabsorption of structural unemployment requires a global effort as well as selectiYe 
action. 
The outlook for the development of prices .tnd wage costs in 1976 is not reassuring, 
although it appears more favourable than In 1975. Undoubtedly the prospect of some 
advances in productivity allows a more gradual development in wage costs per unit of 
output to be hoped for, and the government's decision not to raise the existing social 
\ 
I 
security contribution rates constitutes, from here onwards, a major contribution to 
holding back inflation. But it is important that this measure should be accompanied 
by a parallel effort from both sides of industry to moderate the rise in nominal incomes 
and attempt to reach the objective proposed by the government (an increase of less 
than 10% in salaries). 
Monetary policy will play an especially important part in 1976. Given that financing 
the budget deficit in 1976 through medium and long-term borrowing could present 
some problems, a resort to short-term methods of financing cannot be avoided; this 
could moreover help in keeping interest rates at a relatively low level. 
In Belgittm the recovery in activity could he delayed compared with the improvement 
in the economic situation expected for Belgium's main trading partners. 
After having been restrictive last year, economic policy has been eased since the 
beginning of 1975. As for budgetary matters, the decision by the Belgian 
Government to advance the starting dates of public investment programmes will 
have its impact chiefly in 1976. In addition, the rate of growth of tax receipts will be 
distinctly lower than during 197 5, a year in which the counter-inflationary policy was 
started, based partly on increased taxation. These two factors alone are likely to cause 
a sizeable increase in the borrowing requirement in terms of execution. Nevertheless, 
given the current short-term outlook for the economy, some further action, 
consisting essentially of a reduction in the burden of income-tax and, if need be, some 
encouragement for residential construction, particularly as regards grants for housing 
and housing improvement, seems appropriate. It is, however, important that, at the 
same time, efforts should continue to be made to moderate the growth of expenditure 
and transfer payments by public administrations. 
Monetary policy could play an important role 10 stimulating activity, through an 
expansion in lending and a lowering of interest rates. The measures easing monetary 
policy recently taken in neighbouring countries have opened the way for similar 
initiatives on the part of the Belgian authorities. It would be particularly desirable to 
ensure that the reduction in base rates is effectively passed on to lending rates. 
In any case, the employment situation could not be improved without a slowing down 
10 the rise in wage costs. In this context tt would be appropriate to keep strict control 
of trading profit margins. 
In Lttxembottrg household and public sector demand could continue to grow at a 
relatively high rate, while exports, especially of iron and steel, are likely to recover 
only gradually under the influence of the expected firming in foreign demand. The 
construction industry, for which the decline in 1975 has been somewhat lessened by 
the expansion in public works, will remain very depressed in 1976, mainly because of 
the persistent weakness in the housing sector. The state deficit (net borrowing 
requirement), should remain substantial in 1976. Indeed the cost of the measures 
needed to neutralize the effects of the worsening in employment will remain high, 
while the yield from direct taxation and in particular from taxes on companies wdl 
scarcely increase. 
17 
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Since the level of employment and of general activity are to a large extent determined 
h\' the trend in exports, economic policy should from now on aim at 
selective support for the private sector. 
In the course of 197 5, the economic recession in the United Ki1~~doll/ proved to be 
deeper, and could well last longer, than officially expected at the time of the Spring 
Budget. The volume of consumers' expenditure was increasingly affected by the con-
traction of real personal disposable income. Private industrial investment, in both 
fixed assets and stocks, fell sharply. The buoyancy of public expenditure, combined 
with a net movement of resources into the balance of payments, however, served to 
limit the fall in overall demand. Nevertheless, unemployment climbed to a new post-
war record level and the rate of inflation remained very high despite some recent signs 
of improvement. Although the current account of the balance of payments improved 
dramatically during the first half of 1975, some deterioration has recently occurred. 
Domestic demand and output are unlikely to show strong signs of recovery before the 
spring of 1976 when inflation is expected to have moderated significantly, leading to a 
reversal of the present trend in consumers' expenditure and a strengthening of 
business confidence. The stimulus from public expenditure, however, is then 
expected to slacken as the cuts announced in the April Budget come into effect. 
Despite the unsatisfactory prospects for output and employment, there will be limited 
scope for reflationary measures so long as the rate of inflation remains unduly high. 
Every effort should therefore be made to ensure that the Government's counter-
inflation policy, as outlined in the July White Paper, is strictly implemented. 
The behaviour of the external balance could also constitute a constraint on the 
authorities' room fo manoeuvre. Should the stimulus arising from the expected 
upturn of world trade be delayed, fundamental changes of policy, including general 
rdlation, should be avoided and action confined to measures of a limited nature 
designed to alleviate the most serious difficulties. 
In order to reverse the present trend towards a rapid expansion of the public sector 
borrowing requirement, the authorities should, from the beginning of the 1976177 
fiscal year, considerably reduce the rate of growth of public expenditure so as to 
achieve a rate below that projected for the nominal increase in gross domestic 
product. To this end, it is particularly important that the new pay limit be strictly 
observed in the entire public sector, including the nationalised industries. 
This budgetary policy should be continued during the expected period of 
recovery so that the size of the reduction of the borrowing requirement i~ 
increased as the upswing gathers momentum. 
The present position with regard to monetary policy should be maintained in 1976, 
and the rate of expansion in money supply should remain below the target rate of 
inflation set out in the July White Paper. This should be complemented by a policy of 
maintaining sufficiently high levels of short-term interest rates to encourage orderly 
capital movements appropriate to the U.K. balance of payments. 
\ 
I 
CONCLUSIONS 
In the light of information available at the beginning of October it appears that the 
recession has bottomed out in France, the Federal Republic of Germany and 
Denmark and is nearly at an end in the majority of the other Member States. 
If, in the course of the coming months, trends towards the replacement of stocks, a 
recovery in external demand and a normalisation of consumer expenditure are 
confirmed and become generalised, a moderate growth of gross Community product 
in real terms during 1976 seems probable. Nevertheless, industrial capacity will not 
necessarily be fully utilised and the employment situation will only improve 
gradually. 
Given the uncertainties which exist as to the behaviour of economic agents, one can 
scarcely be sure of the amplitude or duration of the expected economic recovery. 
Therefore it will be necessary to follow very carefully the subsequent development of 
the conjunctural situation within the framework of frequent consultations and close 
coordination between Member States. 
The Community should not in the immediate future count too much on a boost to 
economic activity from third countries. Its weight in international trade forces the 
Community itself to contribute to the recovery in the world conjunctural situation. A 
s1milar responsability falls on Member States in the Community context. 
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I II 
Denmark 0.7 1.6 
Germany (F.R.) 1.8 2.1 
France 1.9 2.1 
Ireland 5.8 6.1 
Italy 2.7 2.9 
Netherlands 2.7 2.9 
Belgium 2.7 2.9 
Luxembourg : : 
United Kingdom 2.3 2.5 
Community (2.2) (2.4) 
TABLE III 
f·llell/pfo)'IJJellf ra/io I 
(as a 0 .,) 
1974 
III IV 
2.5 2.8 
2.6 3.1 
2.5 3.0 
6.7 8.0 
3.1 2.8 
3.2 3.5 
3.2 3.6 
: 0.1 
2.7 2.8 
(2.8) (3.0) 
1975 
I II July August 
3.9 4.3 3.8 4.5 
3.6 4.6 4.7 4.8 
3.3 3.8 3.9 4.0 
9.2 . 8.9 . 8.9 9.0 
3.1 : : : 
3.9 4.3 4.5 4.7 
4.3 5.1 5.2 5.3 
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
3.0 3.8 4.4 4.8 
(3.4) (4.1) (4.4) (4.7) 
1 Number of unemployed as% of civilian labour force; seasonally adjusted figures for final month of each quarter. As a 
result of disparities in definition, unemployment statistics cannot be compared between countries but only reflect 
developments within each country. ' 
Source: Rates calculated from S.O.E.C. figures. 
TABLE IV 
Changes in cons11111er prices si11ce 1973 
Dec. June Dec. Febr. 
73 74 74 75 
June Dec. June Aug. 
74 74 75 75 
Half-yearly increase 
Denmark 7.0 7.0 
Germany (F.R.) 3.5 2.3 
France 8.4 6.2 
Ireland 10.4 8.7 
Italy 10.9 12.3 
Netherlands 5.5 
Belgium 8.3 
Luxembourg 6.1 
United Kingdom 10.8 
Community 7.8 
U.S.A. 6.1 
Canada 6.6 
Japan 12.5 
t Ireland quarterly variations. 
Sources: Services of the Commission. 
: Figures not available. 
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5.0 
6.8 
4.9 
7.5 
6.4 
5.8 
5.4 
8.7 
(%) 
3.4 3.8 
4.1 2.4 
5.2 4.7 
14.6 5.2 
6.0 4.0 
4.6 5.2 
5.3 4.8 
5.5 4.6 
17.3 14.2 
7.5 5.9 
3.3 3.6 
4.7 5.9 
4.7 : 
1975 
April May June July August 
Increase on preceding month 
(" .,) 
0.3 1.S 0.6 0.5 0.2 
0.8 0.6 0. 7 0.0 -0.1 
0.9 1.0 0.7 0.7 0.7 
6.1 (1) - 0.8 (1) 
1.3 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.5 
1.2 0.6 0.2 0.5 1.0 
1.1 0.8 0.4 1.0 0.8 
1.2 1.0 0.7 0.9 0.4 
3.9 4.2 1.9 1.0 0.6 
1.6 1.5 0.9 0.5 0.4 
0.5 0.4 0.8 1.1 0.3 
0.5 0.9 1.5 1.4 1.0 
2.2 0.7 0.1 0.2 : 
August 
74 
August 
75 
Increase 
(%) 
9.5 
5.9 
11.0 
18.9 
13.2 
10.4 
11.4 
10.6 
26.9 
13.2 
8.6 
II. 1 
: 
\ 
/ 
TABLE V 
E.'\-penditure, receipts and net balance of central government budgets 
Expenditure Receipts 
Percentage change 
1974 1975 1974 1975 
Denmark2 + 23.0 + 16Yz + 10.0 -
Germany (F.R.) + 13.3 + 18 + 6.8 -
Prance + 14.9 + 23 + 20.0 -
Ireland + 27.6 + 37 + 18.5 + 
Italy + 17.3 + 32 + 27.5 + 
Netherlands + 16.3 + 25 + 8.1 + 
Belgium + 15.5 + 22 + 19.0 + 
Luxembourg + 22.7 + 22Yz + 23.4 -
United Kingdom2 + 32.9 + 28Yz + 24.0 + 
3 r- 34.6 + 33 + 24.0 + 
Mrd, Dkr, DM, Pfr; ~fio £, Mrd Lit., Fl, Fb, Fix, Mio £. 
1974/75, 1975j76. 
% 
1 
Yz 
19Yz 
31 
14 
21 
21~ 
2512 
25~ 
Net balance 
Value I As % of G.D.P. 
1974 1975 1974 1975 
- 0.4 - 10.6 - 0.2 - 5.2 
- 16.8 - 64.5 - 1.7 - 6.2 
I 5.7 - 35.0 + 0.4 - 2.4 
- 335.' - 616 - 11.6 - 17.4 
- 6 912 -9 300 - 7.1 - 8.3 
-
2.- - 8.7 - 1.5 - 4.3 
- 76.0, - 99.0 - 3.6 - 4.3 
3.0 - 2.4 t 3.6 - 3.1 
- 5 111 - 7 910 - 6.3 - 7.8 
- 1 621 - 4 810 - 2.0 - 4.7 
3 Actual expenditure (i.e. total expenditure less net loans and advances), and balance of actual transactions (i.e. net 
borrowing requirement excluding the balance of loans and advances). 
Source: Services of the Commission. 
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Mio U.A. 
~ Year 0 
INTRA E.E.C. 
Germany (F.R.) 73 
74 
75 
France 73 
74 
75 
Italy 73 
74 
75 
Netherlands 73 
74 
75 
B.L.E.U. 73 
74 
75 
United Kingdom 73 
74 
75 
Ireland 73 
74 
75 
Denmark 73 
74 
75 
E.E.C. Total 73 
74 
7S 
Ger-
TABLE VII 
C O!I/!JJUIZiO' trade balance 
1973, 1974 and 19751 
France ltah Nether-
many Ltnlbc 
- 101 - 53 + 62 
- 152 - 109 + 82 
- 77 - 16 + 102 
+ 104 - 64 + 33 
+ 167 - 103 + 58 
+ 96 - 47 + 53 
+ 23 + 56 + 33 
+ 97 + 93 + 42 
- 24 + 34 + 31 
- 61 - 19 - 26 
- 45 - 34 - 27 
- 78 - 33 - 20 
+ 12 - 13 - 21 - 34 
+ 43 - 12 - . 16 - 3 
+ 27 + 18 0 - 24 
+ 82 + 36 + 10 + 44 
+ 125 + 43 + 22 + 80 
+ 92 + 61 + 14 + 65 
+ 6 - 0 + 1 + 2 
+ 8 + 6 + 2 + 4 
+ 1 + 2 + 1 + 3 
+ 48 + 5 - 9 + 13 
+ 57 + 4 - 7 + 22 
+ 42 + 4 - 9 + 21 
+ 214 - 36 - 162 + 153 
+ 452 - 52 - 238 + 285 
+ 156 + 9 - 77 + 251 
:Monthly average 
B.L.E.U. United Ireland Den-Kingdorr 3 mark 
- 11 - 92 - 6 - 49 
- 36 - 136 - 9 - 55 
- 21 - 104 - 4 - 45 
+ 34 - 49 - 1 - 7 
+ 34 - 66 - 8 - 7 
- 2 - 70 - 5 - 7 
+ 17 - 20 - 1 - 9 
+ 10 - 35 - 3 + 5 
- 6 - 24 - 1 + 8 
- 30 - 50 + 0 - 12 
+ 3 - 36 - 2 - 23 
+ 35 - 23 + 2 - 21 
+ 29 + 1 - 13 
+ 38 + 0 - 16 
+ 16 + 2 - 12 
- 27 - 17 + 22 
- 13 - 19 + 16 
- 2 - 24 + 35 
- 1 + 16 + 2 
+ 1 + 31 + 2 
+ 0 + 25 + 1 
+ 11 - 24 - 2 
+ 12 - 20 - 2 
+ 12 - 27 - 1 
- 7 - 190 - 26 - 66 
+ 11 - 224 - 43 - 78 
+ 16 - 207 - 31 - 41 
25 
~ Year Ger- France Italy Nether- B.L.E.U. United Ireland Den-many lands2 Kingdom 3 mark 0 
EXTRA E.E.C. 
U.S.A. 73 + 72 - 94 - 27 - 85 + 1 - 17 + 1 - 5 
74 + 87 - 128 - 54 - 110 - 23 - 117 - 0 - 10 
75 - 46 - 143 - 86 - 128 - 46 - 136 - 5 - 7 
Japan 73 - 21 - 8 - 6 - 12 - 5 - 28 - 1 - 8 
74 - 12 - 32 - 8 - 16 - 8 - 44 ..:. 2 - 11 
75 - 23 - 45 - 11 - 21 - 17 - 62 - 1 - 5 
O.P.E.C. 4 73 - 95 - 109 - 139 - 129 - 35 - 47 - 4 - 14 
74 - 288 - 372 - 451 - 284 - 138 - 491 - 16 - 58 
75 : : : : : : : : 
Other 73 + 675 + 154 - 37 + 32 - 97 - 436 - 15 - 29 
74 + 1 094 + 120 + 43 + 110 + 60 - !57 - 18 + 12 
75 : : : : : : : : 
EXTRA E.E.C. Totaal 73 + 631 - 57 - 209 - 194 - 136 - 528 - 19 - 56 
74 + 881 - 412 - 470 - 300 - 109 - 809 - 36 - 67 
75 + 865 - 66 - 228 - 273 - 175 - 588 - 22 - 91 
WORLD 73 + 845 - 93 - 371 - 41 - 143 - 718 - 45 - 122 
74 + 1 333 - 464 - 708 - 15 - 98 - 1 033 - 79 - 145 
75 + 1 021 - 57 - 305 - 22 - 159 - 795 - 53 - 132 
Source: S.O.E.C. 
1975: January-June only. 
2 1975: Netherlands: January-May only. 
3 1975: Ireland: Based on National Statistics converted to Units of Account. 
4 O.P.E.C. Includes Algeria, Bahrain, Equador, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and 
Venezuela. 
Figures not available. 
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